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Abstract
There is evidence that retail trade regulations may have a signifi cant impact on prices, 
employment and productivity. In the case of Spain, the retail trade sector is subject to a wide 
ranging set of regional regulations. This paper provides a database and a set of indicators on 
the main restrictions to retail trade in place in Spain’s Autonomous Regions (Comunidades 
Autónomas) between 1997 and 2007. The restrictions bear on the following regulatory 
aspects: shop opening hours, seasonal sales, defi nitions of large retail outlets, regional 
licensing of hard discount stores, moratoria in retail trade licence issuance and specifi c 
taxes on large retail outlets. The paper next presents an aggregate indicator constructed on 
the basis of these restrictions using factor analysis. Lastly, using data panel techniques, this 
paper provides estimates of the effect of trade restrictiveness (using the aggregate indicator) 
on commercial density, the employment in the sector and the rate of infl ation in each region. 
The results of this research point to an increase in the level of regulation over the course of 
the period. Further, there is evidence that greater regulation may be associated with higher 
infl ation, lower employment in the sector and greater commercial density. In any event, 
these results should be viewed with caution given the necessary limitations of the regulation 
indicator used and the limited data period available.
Keywords: Market regulation, retailing, barriers to entry, shop opening hours.
JEL classifi cation: K23, L81.
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1 Introduction 
The retail trade sector is of great importance in Spain, accounting for 4.7% of the 
economy’s GVA in 2006 and for 9.5% of total employment in 2007. Its significance for 
the economy as a whole is, however, even greater insofar as retailing involves placing 
a large portion of consumer goods at the disposal of customers, meaning that the 
behaviour of this sector may be of crucial importance for variables such as final 
product prices. 
Retailing is characterised, moreover, by very extensive regional regulations in 
Spain. On several occasions these regulations have been identified by the OECD, the 
IMF and the European Commission as generating numerous barriers to competition,1 
prompting recommendations by these organisations calling for the liberalisation of the 
sector. Among the Spanish agencies, the TDC (Competition Court) published a report 
in 2003 on the main problems concerning the sector regulations, recommending 
eliminating many of the criteria applied by the regional governments in the case of a 
second trading licence and opting for liberalisation of opening hours. 
Many papers have analysed the impact of retailing regulations on different 
macroeconomic variables. A compendium of various papers written in the 1990s can 
be consulted in Boylaud and Nicoletti (2001). Among the latest empirical studies, 
mention should also be made of Bertrand and Kramarz (2002), the IMF (2004), Burda 
and Weil (2005), Skuterud (2005), Viviano (2006), Hoffmaister (2006), Orea (2008) and 
Schivardi and Viviano (2008). Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) for France, Viviano (2006) 
for Italy, and the IMF (2004) for Spain, all find that the more restrictive retailing policy is, 
the lower employment will be in the sector. Along the same lines, Skuterud (2005) 
provides evidence of how deregulation of Sunday and public holiday trading in Canada 
led to an increase in employment. Likewise focusing on shop opening hours, but for 
the United States, Burda and Weil (2005) conclude that the greater the restrictiveness 
of regulations, the lower employment, wages and productivity in the sector are, but 
they find no significant effects on prices. Nonetheless, the IMF (2004) and Hoffmaister 
(2006) find that, in Spain's case, the barriers to freedom of trading translate into higher 
prices. Likewise for Spain, Orea (2008)2 finds that the regulations introduced in 1997 
have been effective in protecting small retailers, although the subsequent increase in 
regulations does not appear to have had a significant impact. For Italy, Schivardi and 
Viviano (2008) identify a negative relationship between barriers to entry in the sector 
and productivity, on the one hand, and the incorporation of information technologies, 
on the other, while the relationship is positive in the case of business margins and 
prices, although the evidence of this latter effect is weaker. 
Some of the above-mentioned papers opt to construct indicators of the 
degree of regulation in the sector that allow comparisons to be made over time and 
                                                                          
1. See, for example, the latest OECD Economic Surveys on Spain and the latest IMF reports pertaining to 
Spain in the context of the “Article IV Consultation”. Regarding the European Commission, mention should be 
made of its 2006 Annual Assessment within the framework of the Community Lisbon Programme, where Spain 
was asked in the context of the national reforms programme to focus, among other objectives, on increasing 
competition in retail markets. 
2. To measure regulation, the author used this paper’s synthetic indicator for 1997 and the difference in this 
indicator between 2007 and 1997. 
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between countries. In this connection it is worth highlighting the efforts made since the 
late 1990s by the OECD to devise structural retail indicators. Using factor analysis, 
these indicators aggregate each country’s regulations on licensing, opening hours and 
price control.3 According to these indicators, and among the 29 countries considered, 
Spain ranked third in 2003 in terms of strictest retail regulations, despite the fact that 
the indicator improved slightly between 1998 and 2003 as a result of the liberalisation 
of fuel prices4 and the introduction of more flexible opening hours. One limitation of 
these indicators, however, is the fact that they only take into account national 
legislation, when in Spain the regulations at the regional level are very important. 
Copenhagen Economics (2005) applied a similar methodology to draw up an indicator 
of the degree of restrictiveness in the internal market for services in 20 EU countries. 
At the regional level and for Spain, Rodríguez (2001) devised one of the first 
indices of regional government intervention in trading policy, drawing on the legislation 
on opening hours and on the establishment of large retail outlets,5 calculating the 
overall indicator as an arithmetical mean of the aspects considered.6 Subsequently, on 
the basis of the TDC report (2003) on the regulation of the sector, the IMF (2004) 
constructed indicators of the regional barriers to openings of large retail outlets. Matea 
and Ortega (2006) updated the IMF indicators to the legislation in force as of May 
2005, while adding as a further barrier the application in certain regions of a specific 
tax on large retail outlets.7 In both cases, the indices were constructed by averaging, 
in the same proportion, each administrative requirement. The Institut Cerdà (2004) 
also devised region-based measures of trading regulations. Specifically, a binary 
variable was assigned to each of the five regulatory aspects considered, depending on 
whether regulation was low or high,8 aggregating them subsequently with ad hoc 
weights. Lastly, BBVA (2008) recently published an indicator of trading regulations 
in 2007, obtained using the principal components technique.9 
This paper seeks to build on this avenue of research by devising regional 
retail trade regulation indicators. The paper will consider a broader range of regulations 
than those envisaged by the IMF (2004) and Hoffmaister (2006). Also, similarly to the 
work of the OECD, the various restrictions will be weighted to an extent going beyond 
simple aggregation. Once the indicators are obtained, the aim is to estimate how 
                                                                          
3. In the preparation of these indicators, the OECD compiled information from the member states based on 
questionnaires for 1998 and 2003. The questions referred to: trade registers for opening food stores; specific 
licences for food stores; specific regulations for large retail outlets; protectionism by established firms against 
new entrants; regulation of shop opening hours; and price controls. 
4. This aspect is beyond the scope of this paper since, although some price controls remain in place (as is the 
case of the prices of non-advertised drugs and of certain products sold in tobacconists’), there are no 
differences across the regions. For the same reason, the need to register to be able to open a food store is not 
taken into account either. 
5. Specifically, each region is catalogued on the basis of four indicators, namely: degree of interventionism of 
the legislation on shop opening hours; definition of large retail establishments; moratoria; and an indicator of 
legal activism in the face of national legislation. 
6. However, in the case of legal activism their weight is halved. 
7. The other variables common to both papers are: definition of large retail outlets (a) on the basis of their 
location, (b) on the basis of multiple criteria, and (c) in accordance with capital share criteria; requirement of a 
second licence for hard discount stores; restrictions on medium-sized outlets regarding installation, expansion, 
sale and change of ownership; requirement of a market viability plan for obtaining of the specific licence; and 
moratoria. 
8. The aspects considered are: definition of large retail outlets; moratoria; Domestic Trade Advisory Committee 
involved in the retail trade licence procedure; Sectoral Plans for Retail Installations; and maximum number of 
Sunday and public holiday openings. 
9. Based on data on the existence of moratoria on new retail openings, the number of authorised Sunday and 
public holiday openings, barriers to entry and the existence of taxes on large retail outlets. 
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regional legislation may have affected various key variables of retail trade in the 
Spanish economy. 
It should be highlighted that the study focuses on regional regulations, 
despite the fact that municipal legislation may prove fundamental in some instances, 
given that moving to the municipal level would increase the number of rules to be 
considered enormously. Moreover, it takes no account of regulations that are common 
to all regional governments, since that would not introduce differences when 
comparing the degree of regulation of retail trade across the regions. The indicators 
are to be constructed for the period 1997-2007. 
Following this introduction, the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
presents the regulatory changes affecting retail trade at both national and regional 
level. Section 3 explains how the indicators are constructed. Section 4 estimates the 
effects of regional regulations on commercial density, inflation and employment in the 
sector. Section 5 draws some brief conclusions. Finally, completing the document are 
several annexes detailing the methodology used to construct the indicators and the 
database employed in the estimates. 
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2 Retail trade regulations in Spain 
In Spain, powers over domestic trade are transferred to the regions, meaning that 
retailing is regulated by the regional governments, although the central government 
has the power to establish basic general economic rules.10 Section 2.1 sets out the 
most significant regulatory changes in national legislation, while Section 2.2 analyses 
regional legislation. Institutions such as the Competition Court (2003) have 
pronounced as follows on the wide-ranging legislative activity of the regional 
governments: “retail distribution is subject to numerous, detailed and disparate 
regulations”.11 
The justification for regional regulation of retailing is to be found in the 
preambles and articles of the different regulations, which highlight the purported 
benefits of regulating the retail trade (e.g. better town planning, greater consideration 
of environmental issues). The difficulties involved in measuring these factors place 
them beyond the scope of this paper. 
As is indicated above, exhaustive analysis of retail trade regulations is an 
arduous and laborious task that is beyond the aim of this paper. Instead, several 
aspects, which the literature considers to be the most representative, have been 
selected for analysis: opening hours, seasonal sales, definition of outlets that require a 
regional government licence, moratoria and specific taxes on large retail outlets. These 
are also the aspects that will be subsequently considered for construction of the 
indicators of the level of regulation. 
2.1 National regulations 
To place the regional regulations in context, it is a good idea to review developments 
in national legislation, as there is a certain parallel between the two sets of regulations. 
In fact, some regional governments generally adapt their regulations to national 
legislation, although there are also cases in which national legislation has been 
influenced by regional regulations. 
In the case of shop opening hours, national legislation has been key. Thus, 
Royal Decree-Law 2/1985 of 30 April 1985 on economic measures liberalised opening 
hours completely. Nevertheless, some regional governments with powers over 
domestic trade matters limited this freedom, resulting in a clash with national 
legislation. To resolve this problem, the Constitutional Court12 ruled that the central 
government could set rules on shop opening hours, which would be binding on the 
regional governments, provided these were basic general economic rules. In light of 
this judgement, the government opted to impose minimum shop opening hours, thus 
tightening up the regulations in force since 1985. In particular, Royal Decree-Law 
22/1993 established that, although regional governments had the power to regulate 
                                                                          
10. Article 149.1.13 of the Spanish Constitution. 
11. According to the European Commission, there are 700 laws and regulations on domestic trade in Spain, 
whereas according to sector sources, 4,600 retail trade regulations have been introduced since powers over 
domestic trade were transferred to the regional governments in 1996. 
12. Judgement 225/93 of 8 July 1993. 
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opening hours, there would be a minimum overall total of 72 hours per week, and a 
limit of eight Sunday and public holiday openings per year.13 
Royal Decree-Law 6/2000 subsequently eased these restrictions. More 
specifically, the number of weekly hours was extended to 90 and a schedule was 
introduced to gradually raise the minimum number of Sunday and public holiday 
openings, from eight in 2000 to twelve in 2004, at the rate of one extra trading day per 
year. Further, retail outlets of less that 300 m² that did not belong to a retail group and 
did not operate under the same name as a retail group were granted total freedom of 
opening. The transitory nature of the regulations on opening hours was also 
confirmed, as it was established that opening hours could be liberalised as from 1 
January 2005,14 provided there was agreement between the central and regional 
governments. In the end, however, Law 1/2004 of 21 December 2004 on opening 
hours reneged on this liberalisation, returning to a more restrictive regime. The number 
of Sundays and public holidays on which retailers could open was set at 12, although 
the regional governments could raise this number or reduce it (in no case to less than 
eight),15 and the overall number of hours was reduced to 72 per week. 
Lastly, mention should also be made of Retail Trade Law 7/1996 of 15 
January 1996 which introduced a series of administrative requirements, including, in 
particular, the need for large retail outlets (2,500 m2 or more) to obtain a second 
specific licence before opening, in this case a regional licence, in addition to the 
municipal licence.16 This was justified by the impact they may have on retailers in 
adjoining municipalities.17 
2.2 Regional regulations 
This section analyses how certain regulatory aspects of retailing have evolved: opening 
hours, seasonal sales, definition of outlets that require a regional government licence, 
moratoria and specific taxes on large retail outlets. 
In the case of opening hours, national legislation has set the pace for 
changes at regional level. The regulations finally adopted by the regional governments 
are very similar to the minimum conditions established in national legislation, especially 
insofar as overall weekly opening hours are concerned. Indeed, as Table 1 shows, up 
to end-2004 the maximum number of weekly opening hours18 was the same, in all 
regions, as the minimum envisaged in national legislation, with just two exceptions: the 
Basque Country, which had no regulations on opening hours, and the Balearic 
                                                                          
13. However, opening hours remained unrestricted for: sales of cakes and pastries, bread, ready-made dishes, 
newspapers and magazines, fuel, flowers and plants; convenience stores; and sales points at border posts, in 
stations, on passenger transport (by road, rail, sea or air) and in tourist areas. Convenience stores are those 
with less than 500 m² that open for at least 18 hours a day and whose stock comprises, in a similar measure, 
books, newspapers, magazines, food, CDs, DVDs, videos, toys, gifts, etc. 
14. Organic Law 2/1996 established a shorter transitory period for regulation of opening hours (up to 1 January 
2001), but regional government opposition to the liberalisation of opening hours led to it being extended. 
15. One aspect of the new legislation that must be viewed positively is the fact that the Sunday and public 
holiday trading days chosen by the regional governments must be attractive from a commercial standpoint. 
16. In addition, selling at a loss was banned and payment terms for large retail outlets were limited. This last 
measure was further strengthened by Law 55/1999 of 29 December 1999 on fiscal, administrative and social 
measures, and by Law 3/2004 which established measures to combat late payment in commercial 
transactions. 
17. Some regional governments had already introduced this requisite prior to 1996; specifically the Basque 
Country (1983), Valencia (1986), Catalonia (1987), Galicia and Navarre (1988), Aragon (1989) and the Canary 
Islands (1994). 
18. There are no limits on opening hours for small retailers. 
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Islands, where it remained at 72 hours. But this changed as from 2005, when new 
national legislation moved the overall minimum weekly total back to 72 hours. Most 
regional governments adopted this new minimum as their maximum, but five regions 
(Castile and Leon, Valencia, Madrid, Navarre and La Rioja) held the maximum number 
of weekly opening hours at 90 hours and Castile-La Mancha waited until 2006 to cut it 
back to 72 hours. 
There are somewhat greater differences between regions when it comes to 
numbers of Sunday and public holiday openings. Moreover, in some regions this 
number may vary between municipalities19; see Table 2 for a summary of these data.20 
Turning to seasonal sales,21 State legislation sets two sales periods per year, 
one starting in early January and the other in the summer holidays, each with a 
minimum duration of one week and a maximum duration of two months. Retailers are 
free to determine the duration of their seasonal sales within the limits established in 
national legislation, but the specific dates for the sales are set by the regional 
governments. Accordingly, in this respect the differences between regions lie in the 
duration of the seasonal sales. Here this variable is measured as the number of days 
of sales permitted each year, including both winter and summer sales.22 As Table 3 
shows, the regions split into two main groups: around 155 days’ sales (e.g. in 
Cantabria, Castile-La Mancha, Castile and Leon, Galicia, Madrid and the 
Basque Country); and around 105 days’ sales (in Andalusia, the Balearic Islands, the 
Canary Islands,23 Catalonia, Murcia, Navarre, Asturias and La Rioja), with Valencia in 
an intermediate position with around 115 days’ sales. Regional legislation on seasonal 
sales is relatively stable over time. 
How each regional government defines “large retail outlets” is important as 
they all now require that these outlets apply for a second (regional) licence in addition 
to the usual municipal one. These definitions vary considerably, both between regions 
and over time. As Table 4 shows, the regional governments have gradually made their 
criteria more stringent. Thus, although in 1997 “large retail outlets” were usually 
defined in terms of floor space (m2), a decade later the criteria had multiplied, save in 
Cantabria, Galicia and Asturias, with different minimum floor space requirements 
according to the population of the municipality in which the outlets were to be 
located.24 In other cases, the criteria are based on the number of employees (and the 
floor space criteria are subsidiary, i.e. they are only applied when the criteria base don 
the number of employees are not used), as, for example, in the Balearic Islands 
                                                                          
19. Since 1998 in Madrid and Galicia, where municipalities may authorise adding one or two trading days to 
the total set for the region as a whole, and in 1999 and 2000 in Castile and Leon, where the addition of a local 
holiday was permitted in certain circumstances. 
20. There was no regional legislation on opening hours in the Basque Country before February 2005. In theory 
this meant there were no limits on opening hours, although in practice no stores opened on Sundays or public 
holidays. And this remains true today, even though regional legislation envisages that retail outlets with more 
than 400 m2 may open on eight Sundays or public holidays. 
21. Under Retail Trade Law 7/1996, seasonal sales are understood to be when goods are on sale, in the same 
store in which they are usually sold, at a reduced price, excluding defective products or those purchased for 
sale below the usual price. 
22. Calculated excluding Sundays, but not adjusted for public holidays or Sunday openings. 
23. The 104 days’ sales for the Canary Islands is the average (104.077) and the mode (104) for the region in 
the period considered. The mode is included for purposes of simplicity, although there are differences of one 
day, according to the island and the year in question. 
24. In this respect, in 2003 the Spanish Competition Court ruled that the criterion linking the definition of “large 
retail outlets” to population ignores the mobility of shoppers and fails to consider that the catchment area of 
such outlets generally extends beyond the specific municipality in which they are located. 
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since 2002. Lastly, other regional governments apply criteria based on the total 
number of outlets of a specific company, or on the total amount of floor space already 
open in the region, as, for example, in Asturias. 
The minimum floor space required in order for stores to be considered “large 
retail outlets” has gradually diminished in most regions, signifying that the need for 
application for a second licence has gradually spread to increasingly smaller outlets. 
The exceptions, in this case, being Aragon, Cantabria, Valencia, Navarre, Asturias and 
La Rioja, all of which have maintained the same criteria for the past 11 years, and the 
Canary Islands and Galicia where the floor space required in order for stores to be 
considered “large retail outlets” has actually increased. 
Specific regional licences may also be required, even if the stores in question 
are not “large retail outlets”. For example, in the case of hard discount stores (see 
Table 5), which are defined, with minor variations between regions, according to the 
minimum number of “own brand” products for sale and a minimum number of stores 
operating under the same name and a minimum floor space. This second licence is 
currently required in seven regions (Andalusia, the Canary Islands, Cantabria, Castile 
and Leon, Extremadura, Madrid and Murcia) and was required in Aragon up to 2005. 
In Asturias the system is virtually equivalent as, since 2003, a “report” is required from 
the regional government’s Council for Industry, Tourism and Trade for hard discount 
stores applying for a municipal licence. 
Specific taxes on large retail outlets are the most recent of all the measures 
analysed. They were introduced in 2001 in Catalonia and Navarre and are currently 
only in force in four regions25 (Aragon, Catalonia, Navarre and Asturias; see Table 6). 
The tax base is the number of m2 of retail activity. In general, the larger the floor space 
or the catchment population (Asturias), the higher the tax. But the exemption threshold 
of the first few thousand square metres means that, in practice, the tax is borne only 
by “large retail outlets”. As indicated, the amount of tax paid varies according to the 
number of m2; the lowest rate stands at €12/m2 in Navarre. 
Many regional governments also have retail moratorium regulations (see Table 
7), banning large retail openings in the region for a specific period of time. Several 
regions have applied moratoria in the past (Andalusia, the Balearic Islands, Cantabria, 
Castile and Leon, Catalonia, Navarre, the Basque Country, Asturias), while in Aragon 
the moratorium affected only the Zaragoza area (2001-2005). There are also cases of 
suspensions and moratoria that extend to smaller stores, such as that on supermarket 
openings introduced in Catalonia in 2001, and of partial suspensions, as for example 
in the Canary Islands where the moratorium applies to a specific area that is 
considered to be “saturated” in terms of retail space. At present moratoria are only in 
force in the Balearic and the Canary Islands. 
                                                                          
25. In all four cases, appeals have been filed against these taxes with the Constitutional Court. 
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3 Construction of indicators 
The next stage was to construct quantitative indicators for each of the aspects 
discussed in the previous section, and a synthetic indicator grouping them together in 
one single index, to permit classification of the regional governments according to the 
level of regulation of the retail trade. The aim of the first such indicators was to provide 
explanatory quantitative variables that could be used to analyse the effect of specific 
regulations. The aim of the synthetic indicator was to permit assessment of the impact 
of the different degree of regulation in each region. 
Broadly speaking, the quantitative indicators were constructed such that 10 
denotes maximum possible regulation and 0 denotes no regulation,26 taking into 
account the number of days of the year in which the regulations limited the freedom of 
decision of retailers or in which they were subject to the corresponding regulations. 
Annex A.1 describes in detail how the indicators were built. 
The aim behind the creation of a synthetic indicator was to summarise all the 
data collected from the individual indicators in one single index, to highlight the 
differences in the level of regulation of retail trade by region. Factor analysis (see Annex 
A.2), which is generally employed by the OECD for its structural indicators, was used 
for this purpose, applied to the individual indicators. 
Charts 1 and 2 present the resultant synthetic indicator.27 As both charts 
show, the regional governments’ administrative requirements, measured by our 
indicator, are greater, in general, than a decade ago. The differences between the 
degree of regulation of the regional governments have also increased over time, 
despite declining slightly since 2005. In fact, the standard deviation, calculated 
annually on the basis of the level of regulation of the regional governments, rose from 
around 0.4 at the end of the 1990s to 0.98 in 2005, before falling back to just under 
0.8 in 2006 and 2007. 
Various alternative estimates of the synthetic indicator were made to test the 
robustness of the results. In particular, given that the variable relating to the definition 
of large retail outlets is the only one that does not represent a theoretical situation (the 
present criteria under national legislation were considered equivalent to the non-
existence of restrictions, meaning that this variable could be affected in the future if 
national legislation were amended), a new version of the indicator was included, 
rescaling this variable so that zero denotes classification as a large retail outlet as from 
5,000 m2. The indicator was also recalculated eliminating the seasonal sales variable, 
since in this case the regulation seems less important than in the other aspects 
analysed.28 Moreover, two alternative methods were used for factor extraction (the 
principal factors method and principal component analysis).29 An indicator built as the 
                                                                          
26. Except for the variable relating to the definition of “large retail outlets”, in which case 0 denotes 2,500 m2 
which is the threshold set in national legislation. 
27. For calculation of the synthetic indicator the Basque Country was excluded (see Annex A.2 for a detailed 
explanation of this exclusion). 
28. As indicated earlier, the duration of the sales is established in national legislation and what varies are the 
specific dates set by the regional governments within which retailers may choose to organise their sales. 
29. For more information on these techniques, see the bibliography. 
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average of the individual indicators was also included. Lastly, two estimates were 
calculated including the Basque Country, the first using the same method as 
employed in the benchmark estimate, and the second calculated as the simple 
average of all the individual indicators. 
The exercise shows that, in terms of degree of regulation, changes in the 
criteria used for the base study result in only minor changes in the order of ranking of 
the regional governments in 2007. Thus, broadly speaking, the main groups remain 
the same, with no significant moves between regions, although the specific values of 
the different regions do change. The only exception being the Balearic Islands, as this 
region proves sensitive to the elimination of the seasonal sales variable and to the use 
of a simple average instead of factor analysis. In both cases, the region’s comparative 
position worsens. Rescaling the variable relating to the definition of large retail outlets 
does not change the order of ranking, but it does increase the degree of regulation of 
all the regions. Conversely, the range in which the indicator moves narrows if the 
seasonal sales variable is eliminated or if the individual indicators are aggregated using 
a simple average. 
These rankings, once established, may then be compared with the findings of 
the other authors mentioned in Section 1. This should be done for a year that is 
included in the highest possible number of studies; 2001 seemed a good choice, as 
the indicators contained in this study and in those of Rodríguez (2001), Institut Cerdà 
(2004) and Hoffmaister (2006) were all available for 2001. For that year, the regions 
with the greatest level of regulation were the same in all the studies. However, in the 
case of the regions with the lowest level of regulation, the degree of coincidence was 
somewhat lower, especially vis-à-vis Rodríguez’s indicator (2001). The other regions 
post intermediate values that are difficult to compare, due to the differences between 
the regulatory aspects analysed and between the aggregation techniques used. The 
findings are similar comparing our indicator for 2007 with the BBVA indicator (2008). 
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4 Estimation of the effects of retail trade regulations 
As advanced in the introduction, several studies have found that retail trade 
regulations have significant effects on various economic variables in the sector. Here 
the synthetic indicator constructed in the previous section will be used to estimate the 
effects of regulation on commercial density, the numbers employed in the sector and 
inflation. In addition, a number of tests will be conducted with the individual 
indicators30 to assess the sensitivity of the inflation rate to different types of 
regulations. 
4.1 Model 
The estimates are obtained by analysis using panel data techniques, with the following 
specification: 
 
where Xi,t is the economic variable of the retail trade of interest in region i and year t; a 
is a constant; Tt are artificial variables (one for each year of the sample) which have a 
value of one in year t and zero in other years; IRi,t is the regulation indicator of region i 
in year t; Yi,t are other explanatory variables of region i in year t; Și are unobservable 
explanatory variables of region i; and vi,t is an error term. The coefficient ȕ1, which 
accompanies the regulation indicator, is the coefficient of interest in this study. 
More specifically, the variables which will be considered are commercial 
density (calculated for different distribution formats), the employment in the sector and 
the inflation rate of the retail products sold.31 The artificial time variables are intended 
to capture time effects common to all regions, such as, for example, the cyclical 
position of the economy. Note that if regulation was very similar in all regions, its effect 
would be indistinguishable from that reflected by the time variables. 
In some cases the significant regulation is not that currently in place; rather, 
that in force some years earlier may be of greater importance. Specifically, this may be 
the case when opening a new retail outlet, since several years may elapse between 
the time the decision is taken and the date when it actually opens its doors to the 
public (this time may be needed to develop the land, obtain all the relevant permits, 
build the establishment, etc.). In fact, sector experts estimate that, depending on the 
municipality, it takes from six to 18 months to open a supermarket, the average being 
around ten months, and up to four years to open a large retail outlet. Similarly, 
employment, insofar as it depends on the number of outlets, will also be sensitive to 
the regulation in place in previous years. For these reasons, the foregoing equation 
has been estimated for various lags of the regulation variable. 
                                                                          
30. In neither case, and for reasons described earlier, do these estimates include the Basque Country.  
31. For more information about the database, see Annex B. 
tivitiYtiIRtTtatiX ,,ln2,1,ln  ¦ KEED
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 19 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0908
 
4.2 Estimation and results 
In all estimates, allowance was made for unobservable variables by performing 
fixed-effects estimation and random-effects estimation,32 and the Hausman test was 
used to choose between one or the other estimation method. Only the option selected 
is reported here. In any event, the existence of varying effects across regions was 
previously confirmed by the Breusch-Pagan test. 
Estimates were made for different commercial density variables.33 Tables 8 to 
11 give commercial density estimates for the total retail distribution formats, for 
traditional food stores, for supermarkets and for hypermarkets, respectively.34 Given 
that the commercial density variables relate to 1 January of each year, while the 
regulation variable refers to the yearly average, it was considered appropriate to add, 
as an explanatory variable, the synthetic regulation indicator (denoted “rspv” in the 
tables) lagged by at least one period. Also tested as possible additional explanatory 
variables in the estimation were GDP per capita and the unemployment rate, both as 
proxies for demand, although with different expected signs (positive for GDP per 
capita and negative for the unemployment rate). Similarly, the average wage in the 
sector was included as a cost variable.35 In general, commercial density seems to be 
sensitive to the unemployment rate; however, except for the estimates relating to 
hypermarkets and for a single specification in the case of supermarkets, GDP per 
capita and average wage in the sector usually do not differ significantly from zero. 
In any event, it should be noted that the results are not always robust to 
changes in the specifications and must therefore be regarded with due caution. The 
aforementioned tables seem to show that a lesser degree of regulation, as measured 
by our synthetic indicator, is associated with lower commercial density in all the 
distribution formats analysed, except, as was to be expected, for hypermarkets, 
where less regulation entailed a higher number of hypermarkets per inhabitant. In 
addition, the coefficient values estimated tended to be higher in the supermarket 
density regressions than in those for traditional food stores. This suggests a greater 
impact of regulation on the former.36 In the specific case of hypermarkets, the 
regulation found to be significant is that in place five years ago.37 Since the equations 
refer to the density at 1 January, this may indicate that the time needed to open 
a hypermarket is around 4.5 years. This is similar to the time reported by Bertrand and 
Kramarz (2002) for France (four years). 
The estimates of the inflation rate in the sector are expressed as per-unit in 
Table 12. In these equations the signs of GDP per capita, average wage growth in the 
                                                                          
32. With fixed effects it is assumed that the unobservable variables vary by region. With random effects it is 
assumed they also have a distribution for each region. 
33. Estimates were also made, by type of outlet, for the number of square metres per inhabitant. However, the 
results were very similar to others reported here and are thus not included in this paper. They are nonetheless 
available on request from the authors. 
34. Both for this variable and for those presented below, only those equations in which the regulation variable 
differs significantly from zero at the 5% level are given. The degree of robustness of the proposed estimates to 
alternative estimates is also reported. 
35. For the same reason as that stated for the synthetic regulation indicator, all these variables are lagged by 
one period. 
36. The coefficients of the commercial density equations are not strictly comparable with those of other 
definitions because they relate to different periods. However, the period is the same when broken down by 
distribution format. 
37. Also, more hypermarkets per inhabitant are observed with increasing GDP per capita, whereas the 
relationship between average wage in the sector and hypermarket commercial density is negative. 
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sector and unemployment rate of the region are as expected (positive for the first two 
and negative for the last). Also, lesser regulation is found to be associated with lower 
inflation.38 The sign and significance of this relationship between degree of regulation 
and inflation are relatively robust to alternative specifications. However, the coefficients 
obtained for the regulation variable vary notably depending on the variables included in 
the estimate.39 
The estimates relating to employment in retailing are shown in Table 13. 
Again, the signs of GDP per capita (positive) and of the average wage in the sector 
(negative) are as expected. On this occasion, the degree of regulation is found to be 
negatively related to employment in the sector, in line with most studies on this 
subject. This relationship is, moreover, fairly robust to the different specifications 
adopted for the estimated equation. This variable is sensitive to contemporary 
regulation and to that in place up to two years earlier. 
Lastly, an exercise was carried out with the individual indicators in which the 
inflation rate was regressed in each case. However, it proved impossible to estimate 
an equation expressing the regulation of the specific tax on large retail outlets, 
because, in the period in question, this variable is zero in all cases. Nor was it possible 
to obtain an equation containing the opening hours regulation variable, since, once 
again, for the estimation period, the indicator is constant and is the same for all 
regions, so the effect of this variable does not differ from that of the constant. The 
results of these estimates are not shown in the tables. In any event, only the estimates 
made with indicators of moratoria and hard discount store licensing show a sufficiently 
robust significant relationship with the inflation rate. Specifically, for these two 
variables, a lesser degree of regulation (no regional licence requirement for hard 
discount stores or shorter retail moratorium periods) is found to be associated with a 
lower inflation rate. 
                                                                          
38. Note that, unlike in the case of commercial density, the inflation rate and all the explanatory variables 
measure the annual average value. 
39. It should be noted that the estimation period also varies depending on the variables used. 
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5 Conclusions 
Several international and national organizations have repeatedly stated that Spanish 
retail trade is subject to extensive regulation, generating numerous barriers to 
competition which, in turn, may be causing distortions in the functioning of the sector. 
To analyse this issue, a set of regional retail trade regulation indicators was first 
formulated for the period 1997-2007 relating to legislation on total weekly opening 
hours, Sunday and public holiday trading, seasonal sales, definitions of establishments 
requiring a regional government licence, the requirement for hard discount stores to 
have a regional government licence, moratoria in retail trade licence issuance and 
specific taxes on large retail outlets. The indicator building strategies followed were, 
first, that of developing regulation indicators for each of the administrative 
requirements considered, and, second, that of constructing a synthetic indicator of all 
of them using factor analysis. A word of caution regarding this synthetic indicator is in 
order for two reasons. First, only a subset of administrative requirements was taken 
into account and thus many are excluded,40 such as, for example, those imposed by 
local governments. Second, given that the construction of a synthetic indicator 
requires weights to be set for each of the factors considered, it was decided 
to set these weights by a purely statistical method. This has the advantage that it is 
not affected by the researcher’s subjective opinion, but it does not take into account 
possible differences in the potential impact of each of the regulatory aspects on the 
different economic variables. Subject to these qualifications, it can be concluded that, 
in general, the regulation currently in place in the retail trade sector is more restrictive 
than at the beginning of the period under analysis (1997). The inter-regional 
differences in the degree of regulation are also greater, and there are significant 
differences in how they have evolved over time. 
The synthetic indicator has been used to explain the regional differences 
observed in commercial density, employment in the sector and the retail inflation rate. 
Once again, mention should be made of the limitations of the analysis due, inter alia, 
to the scarcity of information in terms both of variables and number of observations. 
Consequently, this may affect the robustness of the econometric results. Subject to 
this qualification, the results seem to confirm the findings of other authors for other 
countries, which associate greater regulation with higher inflation, lower employment in 
the sector and higher commercial density. In the latter case, except for hypermarkets, 
for which lesser regulation is associated with a higher number of hypermarkets per 
inhabitant. 
 
                                                                          
40. Nevertheless, given the objective of this study, the regulation common to all regions was not taken into 
account because it has no bearing on the differences in regulation between regions. 
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Annex A:  Indicator construction methodology 
1 Quantitative indicators for each variable 
 
As a first step towards constructing a synthetic indicator (methodology described 
below), it is necessary to convert each regulatory aspect of regional regulations into a 
numerical variable. 
In the case of the regulations on overall weekly opening hours, Sundays and 
public holidays41 and seasonal sales, this step is immediate. This is because the 
variable in question consists, in the first case, of the number of hours and, in the other 
two cases, of the number of days on which outlets are allowed to open or to offer 
seasonal discounts, respectively, that is, the variables coincide with the tables 
presented in Section 2. 
Constructing a variable with a single value for each year and region for the 
definition of large retail outlet is much more complex, given that the regions apply 
numerous and notably different criteria. The purpose of the proposed indicator is to 
provide a straightforward and uniform measurement which, taking into account all this 
information, gives an idea of the greater or lesser degree of restriction implied by the 
need to apply for a second (specific) trading licence. 
For this purpose, a variable was constructed which summarises all the 
available information in a single figure: the average number of m2 above which a 
specific trading licence is required in a region in a given year. This variable is 
constructed as follows: first, information is gathered on the minimum requirements for 
a store to be considered a "large retail outlet" for each region and year. Where regions 
establish criteria based on quantities other than a specific number of m2, for example, 
on numbers employed (as in the Balearic Islands), "subsidiary" criteria are used which 
are based on m2 (or m2 per size of municipality). All this information is aggregated in 
one single figure of m2 per year using the "population affected" criterion. More 
specifically, the percentage of the population in each region (according to the 2001 
census) affected by each limit each year is calculated and the population-weighted 
population criteria are aggregated.42 The resultant variable is presented in Table A.1. 
The lower the m2 value, the greater the restrictions on trade, insofar as, on average, 
according to the population affected, application for a second licence would be 
required of smaller retail outlets. 
The requirement of a regional licence for setting up hard discount stores was 
handled more simply, using a binary variable which takes the value 1 for the years and 
regions where it was in force and the value 0 for the years and regions where it was 
                                                                          
41. It should be pointed out that when the Sunday and public holiday variable was constructed for the Basque 
Country, the de facto situation rather than current legislation was taken into account. This is because the large 
retail outlets have not opened on Sundays and public holidays in this region, despite, on occasions, having 
stated their intention to do so [see the appearance of the chairman of the Basque Competition Court (2008). 
42. Thus, for example, according to the criteria applied in Aragon, the total of 1,341 m² in Table A.1 is the sum 
of 600 m² multiplied by 0.425 (the proportion of the population living in 2001 in municipalities with fewer than 
20,000 inhabitants), plus 1,000 m² multiplied by 0.064 (the proportion of the population living in municipalities 
with 20,000 to 499,999 inhabitants), plus 2,000 m² multiplied by 0.511 (the proportion of the population living 
in municipalities with at least 500,000 inhabitants). 
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not. In cases in which the requirement was not in force for a full year, the value it takes 
corresponds to the percentage, expressed in per-unit terms, of the days in the year in 
which it was in force. The same procedure was used for the specific taxes and 
moratoria variables. Only moratoria on large retail outlets are included in the latter 
variable and, therefore, other moratoria which could be defined as "relative" or of 
another type are not calculated. 
Once the quantitative variables for each regulatory aspect considered were 
available, they were transformed for cross-comparison purposes. To this end, they 
were expressed on a scale of 0 to 10, 10 being the maximum restriction level and 0 
being the minimum restriction level. This scale is arbitrary and was chosen, without 
affecting the findings of the paper, for its simplicity. Furthermore, the range of 0 to 10 
covers the theoretical situation (of the non-existence of restrictions and maximum 
restrictions, respectively) and, therefore, it does not reflect the extreme values of the 
sample.43 Consequently, this range is not sensitive to regulatory changes which may 
occur in the future. 
Thus, the indicator of overall weekly opening hours expresses, on a scale of 0 
to 10, the proportion of hours that outlets cannot open, considering a total of 144 
hours from Monday to Saturday. Equivalently, the Sunday and public holiday indicator 
represents the percentage, on a scale of 0 to 10, of Sundays and public holidays on 
which outlets are not permitted to open,44 while the seasonal sales indicator reflects 
the percentage, on a scale of 0 to 10, of days in the year on which there can be no 
seasonal discounts. 
Table A.1 was taken as the starting point to create an indicator, on a scale of 
1 to 10, determining how restrictive the definition of "large retail outlet" is. The figures 
in the table were recalculated, assigning a value of zero to cases in which the criterion 
for consideration as a "large retail outlet" is 2,500 m2, and a value of 10 to a 
hypothetical situation in which the second licence is a requirement for all outlets, 
irrespective of size.45 
The indicators of moratoria,46 of the prerequisite of a regional licence to open 
hard discount stores and of specific taxes were constructed as the proportion of days 
on which the specific measure had been in force in the year (expressed on a scale of 0 
to 10). 
These individual quantitative indicators are presented in Tables A.2 to A.8. 
 
 
                                                                          
43. The only exception is the variable relating to the definition of "large retail outlets", in which case the non-
existence of restrictions (value zero) was considered equivalent to the provisions of national legislation, defining 
large retail outlets as those with at least 2,500 m². 
44. The total number of Sundays and public holidays in a year is 66, or 67 in leap years. 
45. That is, 10 would be assigned if the individual indicator was 0 m2. 
46. It should be noted that when the moratoria indicator was calculated, the only moratoria taken into account 
were those representing a complete ban on openings of large retail outlets, thus excluding the moratoria in 
Catalonia on supermarkets in 2001 and the partial moratorium in 2006, and the relative moratoria in force in the 
Canary Islands. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 24 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0908
 
2 Construction of a synthetic indicator 
 
As indicated above, the aim of the synthetic indicator is to summarise all the 
information included in the individual indicators in a single index, to highlight the 
differences in the level of regulation of retail trade by region. 
Before creating this indicator, the particular case of the Basque Country 
should be mentioned. In this region, until a short time ago, there was no legislation on 
overall weekly opening hours or Sunday and public holiday openings. Consequently, if 
the national regulations were applied, this would be equivalent to assuming that there 
were no limits on the overall weekly opening hours and Sunday and public holiday 
openings envisaged in national legislation. However, as mentioned above, in practice, 
the large retail outlets in this region do not open on non-business days and there is no 
evidence of actual compliance with overall weekly opening hours. In these 
circumstances, and considering that the aim was to create a regulation indicator that 
could be used as an explanatory variable of the changes in the main sector 
aggregates at regional level, it was decided to exclude the Basque Country47 from the 
synthetic indicator. 
Once the individual indicators had been calculated, the synthetic indicator 
was constructed using the same methodology as that employed by the OECD48 for its 
structural indicators. Specifically, factor analysis, which makes it possible to obtain a 
weight for each variable and to aggregate them in a single indicator, was applied. 
These weights are correlated with the higher or lower variability of the different 
variables, i.e. factor analysis gives more weight to those variables with a higher 
variability between the different regions and years. The weights constructed in this way 
have the advantage of responding to the data, rather than to the subjective opinion of 
the authors about the importance of any particular variable. 
Factor analysis summarises the individual indicators in a number of "factors" 
which reflect their underlying structure. Specifically, this technique is based on the 
correlations between individual indicators (see Table A.10) and analyses whether the 
individual indicators follow any pattern of relationships, so that the data can be 
reordered into a smaller set of factors which summarises the interrelationships 
observed. Consequently, for it to make sense to use factor analysis, the variables 
must be correlated, since if there is no or little correlation it is unlikely they will share 
common factors. To check that this requirement was met, Bartlett's test of sphericity 
was applied49 and was passed satisfactorily. Similarly, Kaiser, Meyer and Olkin's 
measure of sample suitability is usually used to confirm that factor analysis is 
appropriate. This measure, which takes into account partial correlation coefficients, 
                                                                          
47. If the Basque Country is not excluded, the indicator obtained is quite different, largely because, as it is 
considered that this region places no limits on overall weekly opening hours, the variance of this variable 
increases and its weight in the synthetic indicator also rises. The results obtained when the Basque Country is 
included are presented in Chart A.1 and in Table A.9. and underline that the measure of suitability of the factor 
analysis deteriorates, meaning that its application seems inappropriate in this case. Nonetheless, if the Basque 
Country is included, the synthetic indicator of regulation in this region would have a value of 3.87 in 2007. 
48. See Nicoletti et al. (2000), Boylaud and Nicoletti (2001), and Conway and Nicoletti (2006). 
49. In Bartlett's test of sphericity the null hypothesis is that there is no correlation between the variables. 
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also supported the use of this technique for the individual indicators in this paper 
(see Table A.11).50 
Each factor is defined as a set of coefficients that measure the correlation 
between the individual indicators and the latent factor. The principal components 
method was used to extract the factors.51 Accordingly, the first component is the 
combination of individual indicators which explains the largest amount of sample 
variability; the second component explains the next largest proportion of variance and 
is uncorrelated with the first component; and so on. The factors obtained in this way 
are rotated52 so that each individual indicator has the closest possible correlation to 
one with one of the factors, and correlations close to zero with the other factors, 
making it easier to interpret the factors. Table A.11 shows the results obtained. 
In order to construct the synthetic indicator, in keeping with standard 
practice, only those factors which met the three following criteria were selected: they 
had an associated eigen-value greater than one; individually they explained at least 
10% of the data variance; and together, they explained at least 60% of the data 
variance. Consequently, the first three factors were selected. Both the first and third 
factors have a clear economic interpretation. Thus, the first factor basically reflects 
regulations on opening hours (both overall weekly opening hours and Sunday and 
public holiday openings), while the third factor relates to licensing regulations (definition 
of large retail outlets, moratoria on trading licences and the requirement of a regional 
licence for hard discount stores). Lastly, the second factor is closely related to the 
seasonal sales and the levying of a specific tax on large outlets. 
The last stage for construction of the synthetic indicator was to calculate 
the weights. Once again, following the OECD methodology, each individual indicator 
was weighted in accordance with the proportion of variance explained by the 
associated factor, while each factor in turn was previously weighted, taking into 
account its contribution to explaining the total sample variance. The resultant weights 
are presented in Table A.11. The overall weekly opening hours and Sunday and public 
holiday trading variables accounted for a combined weight of 37%, while the variables 
related to regional licences (the hard discount stores, large retail outlets and retail 
moratoria variables) accounted for a weight of 35%. The seasonal sales and specific 
tax variables each had a weight of 14%. 
 
 
 
                                                                          
50. It is considered acceptable to apply a factor analysis model to data as from a value of 0.5 for Kaiser, Meyer 
and Olkin's measure of sample suitability. 
51. The advantage of this method is that since it is descriptive, it requires no assumptions about the data 
generation process. 
52. For the rotation the varimax method was used to minimise the number of variables that have a high loading 
on the same factor. 
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Annex B: Description of database 
It is difficult to compile sector data on a regional level, and, when obtained, in many 
cases the data relate to a limited time period. 
Commercial density was the first dependent variable used. It was constructed 
taking, as the denominator, the population according to the Regional Accounts of the 
INE (National Statistics Office) and, as the numerator, the number of retail activities 
subject to economic activity tax as at 1 January of each year, drawn from La Caixa’s 
Economic Yearbooks. The advantage of this latter statistical source is that it facilitates 
a breakdown of retail activities by type of outlet. In particular, estimates were made for 
the aggregate series, traditional food stores (as an exponent of traditional stores), 
supermarkets and hypermarkets (as a representative of large retail outlets). 
Nevertheless, these series present several weaknesses. First, the breakdown 
by type of outlet is only available as from 2003. Moreover, the supermarket variable 
does not distinguish between hard discounters and others; this may affect the results, 
considering that nine regions have legislation that does distinguish between them. 
Similarly, in some cases the definition of hypermarkets, which includes outlets as from 
1,500 m2, may not be very appropriate to reflect the impact of regulation on large retail 
outlets. Indeed, in three regions (Cantabria, Castile and Leon, and Asturias) this series 
grows when it coincides with moratoria on large retail outlet openings. Accordingly, 
the findings must be viewed with due caution. 
The source for the numbers employed in retailing was the 1997 Retail Trade 
Survey and, as from 1999, the INE’s Annual Trade Survey. There are, therefore, no 
data for 1998 and the last year for which data are available is 2006. 
Regarding the inflation rate, average annual indices of prices of non-energy 
goods were compiled, aggregating four of the twelve groups that make up the 
consumer price index: food and non-alcoholic beverages; alcoholic beverages and 
tobacco; clothing and footwear; and furniture and household equipment. This gives a 
series that approximates the type of products sold by retailers.53 Although these 
indices were calculated with base year 1992 (series up to 2001) and base year 2001 
(data for 2002 onward), the findings obtained from the more recent data proved less 
than satisfactory, probably due partly to the fact that with the new base year, the 
weightings are reviewed annually. Moreover, given the extent of the methodological 
differences between the two databases, they were not linked. 
For the explanatory variables, the following were considered: GDP per capita, 
drawn from the INE’s Regional Accounts; average wage in the sector, calculated as 
the ratio between wages and numbers employed according to the 1997 Retail Trade 
Survey and the Annual Trade Survey for 1999 and subsequent years; and the 
unemployment rate, drawn from the Labour Force Survey for each region, adjusted for 
the change in the definition of unemployment in 2002 and for the changes in 
                                                                          
53. Although excluding some items, such as personal care products (included in “Others”) and cameras 
(included in “Recreation and culture”), and including some services, such as domestic services (included in 
“Furniture and household equipment”). 
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methodology and in the questionnaire introduced in 2005. Once again, there are no 
data for average wages for 1998 and 2007. 
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Andalusia 72 72 72 72 90 90 90 90 72 72 72
Aragon 72 72 72 72 90 90 90 90 72 72 72
Balearic Islands 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72
Canary Islands 72 72 72 72 90 90 90 90 72 72 72
Cantabria 72 72 72 72 90 90 90 90 72 72 72
Castile-La Mancha 72 72 72 72 90 90 90 90 90 72 72
Castile and Leon 72 72 72 72 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
Catalonia 72 72 72 72 90 90 90 90 72 72 72
Valencia 72 72 72 72 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
Extremadura 72 72 72 72 90 90 90 90 72 72 72
Galicia 72 72 72 72 90 90 90 90 72 72 72
Madrid 72 72 72 72 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
Murcia 72 72 72 72 90 90 90 90 72 72 72
Navarre 72 72 72 72 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
Basque Country 72 72 72
Asturias 72 72 72 72 90 90 90 90 72 72 72
La Rioja 72 72 72 72 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
STATE
2002
72
2004 2005 2006 2007REGION
72
20031997 1998 1999
90
2000 2001
No regulations
TABLE 1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. The vertical lines denote a change in national legislation.
OVERALL WEEKLY OPENING HOURS (a)
Andalusia 8 8 8 8 9 10 11 12 8 8 8
Aragon 8 8 8 8 9 10 11 12 8 8 8
Balearic Islands 8 8 8 8 9 10 5 12 8 8 8
Canary Islands 8 8 8 8 9 10 11 12 9 9 9
Cantabria 8 9 10 10 9 10 11 12 8 8 8
Castile-La Mancha 8 8 8 8 9 10 11 12 8 8 8
Castile and Leon 8 8 8 (d) 8 (d) 9 10 11 12 8 8 8
Catalonia 8 8 8 9 9 10 11 12 8 8 8
Valencia 8 7 8 9 9 9 11 11 10 8 8
Extremadura 9 8 8 8 9 10 11 12 8 8 8
Galicia 10 8 (c) 8 (c) 8 (c) 9 (c) 10 (c) 11 (c) 16 (c) 8 (c) 8 (c) 8 (c)
Madrid 13 13 (c) 13 (c) 14 (c) 18 (c) 19 (c) 21 (c) 21 (c) 20 (c) 20 (c) 20 (c)
Murcia 8 8 8 8 9 10 11 12 12 10 10
Navarre 8 8 8 8 9 10 11 12 12 8 8
Basque Country (b) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Asturias 7 (e) 8 8 8 9 10 11 12 8 8 8
La Rioja 8 8 8 8 9 10 11 12 8 8 8
STATE 9 10 11 12
REGION 1997 1998 1999
8   8
2004 2005 2006 200720032000 2001 2002
SUNDAY AND PUBLIC HOLIDAY OPENINGS (a) TABLE 2
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. The vertical lines denote a change in national legislation.
b. In theory, retailers are free to choose the Sundays and public holidays they wish to open, subject to the number of days 
envisaged in national legislation. In practice there are no Sunday and public holiday openings. 
c. Plus one or two local holidays in certain municipalities.
d. Plus a local holiday, in certain circumstances.
e. Although the first regulations, for the period 20/05/1997 to 19/05/1998, envisaged eight days, one of these days
corresponded to 1998.
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Andalusia 105 105 104 104 104 106 105 104 104 104 104
Aragon 143 142 143 142 144 144 113 113 105 105 126
Balearic Islands 106 106 105 106 106 106 106 106 105 105 106
Canary Islands (b) 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104
Cantabria 158 157 159 156 158 158 132 159 156 156 157
Castile-La Mancha 163 164 164 165 164 163 163 165 164 164 164
Castile and Leon 156 156 156 156 155 157 156 157 156 156 155
Catalonia 104 104 104 104 103 105 104 105 103 102 101
Valencia 106 118 117 117 114 120 112 118 116 115 114
Extremadura 156 105 105 106 106 105 104 105 105 104 99
Galicia 157 157 157 158 156 157 157 158 157 157 156
Madrid 156 156 157 157 158 157 156 158 157 157 158
Murcia 105 105 104 105 106 106 105 106 103 104 105
Navarre 104 104 104 104 105 105 104 105 103 103 103
Basque Country 151 151 151 152 150 151 151 152 151 151 150
Asturias 105 106 105 106 106 106 106 106 105 103 103
La Rioja 104 104 104 104 104 105 104 105 103 104 103
REGION 2004 2005 2006 20071997 1998 1999 20032000 2001 2002
SEASONAL SALES (a) TABLE 3
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. The number of days on which retailers may choose to hold seasonal sales. Calculated not including Sundays, 
but not adjusted for public holidays.
b. There are minor differences - one day more or less -  according to the different islands and years. 
-
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Floor
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based on 
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Floor
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Conditions
based on 
local
population
Floor
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Conditions
based on 
local
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Floor
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based on 
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Floor
space
Conditions
based on 
local
population
2500 Not applicable
600
1000
2000
300 Under 20000 250 Under 3000
2500 Not applicable 500
20000-
200000 400
700 Over 200000 600
800 Over 20000
1300
750 Under 20000
1000
1500 Over 200000
2500 Not applicable
2500 Not applicable 2000 Not applicable
1000 Up to 10000
1500 10001 - 50000
2500 Over 50000
2500 In provincial capitals
1000 Up to 10000 800 Up to 10000
1300 1300 10001 - 25000
2500 Over 25000 2000 25001 - 240000
2500 Over 240000
600 Under 40000
1000 Over 40000
750 Under 10000
2500 Not applicable 1500 10000- 50000
2000 Over 50000
500 Under 9000
1000 9000 - 50000
2000 Over 50000
1500 Under 10000
2500 2000 10000- 25000
2500 Over 25000
600 Up to 5000
900 5001 - 15000
2500 1500 15001 - 35000
1800 35001 - 75000
2500 Over 75000
1500 Under 12000
2500 Over 12000
2500 Pamplona and surrounding area
400 5000
2000 Not applicable 800 5000 - 10000
1000 10000 - 24999 
2000 Over 25000
2500
1000 Under 10000
1500 10001 - 24999
2500 Over 25000
BALEARIC 
ISLANDS (a)
ARAGON
ANDALUSIA
1998 1999
CATALONIA
CASTILE & LEON
CASTILE-LA
MANCHA
CANTABRIA
REGION
Under 20000
Over 500000
All islands
CANARY ISLANDS (c)
LA RIOJA
ASTURIAS (e)
BASQUE 
COUNTRY (d)
NAVARRE
Not applicable
GALICIA
EXTREMADURA
VALENCIA
1997
MURCIA 
Not applicable
Not applicable
MADRID
10001 - 20000
2000 2001 2002
20000 - 199999
20000 - 499999
3001 - 10000
Palma
10001 - 25000
CRITERIA FOR DEFINITION AS "LARGE RETAIL OUTLET" (a) TABLE 4
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. Floor space refers to retail floor space (not floor area).
b. Between 2002 and 2007, the definiton of "large retail outlet" was based on the number of employees (principal criterion). 
The floor space figures in the table are the subsidiary criterion. 
c. Differentiation between the different islands was only established following enactment of Law 10/2003 of 3 April 2003.
d. Between 10/11/2000 and 27/03/2001 the limit was set at 400 m2, with certain exceptions according to activity 
and other characteristics.
e. Law 10/2002 of 19 November 2002 also includes, in its definition of large outlets, stores belonging to chains with more than 
25 outlets in the region or with total area in the region of 10000 m2.
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Floor
space
Conditions
based on 
local
population
Floor
space
Conditions
based on 
local
population
Floor
space
Conditions
based on 
local
population
Floor
space
Conditions
based on 
local
population
Floor
space
Conditions
based on 
local
population
1000
1300
2500
600
1000
2000
BALEARIC ISLANDS (b) 250
400
600
800
1300
750
1500
2000
500
750
1000
2500
750
2000 Not applicable 1000
2000
1000
1500
2000
800
1300
2000
2500
600
1000
750
1500
2000
500 Under 9000
1000 9000 - 50000 2500
2000 Over 50000
1500
2000
2500
600
900
1500
1800
2500
1500 Under 12000
2500 Over 12000
2500 Pamplona and surrounding area
400 5000
800 5000 - 10000
1000 10000 - 24999 
2000 Over 25000
2500 Not applicable
1000 Under 10000
1500 10001 - 24999
2500 Over 25000
REGION
15001 - 35000
35001 - 75000
Over 75000
10000- 25000
Over 25000
Up to 5000
5001 - 15000
Over 40000
Under 10000
Over 50000
Not applicable
Under 10000
10000 - 50000
Up to 10000
Over 50000
10001 - 25000
Up to 10000
Over 240000
Under 40000
Not applicable
Under 20000
Over 20000
Not applicable
Up to 10000
Over 25000
Under 3000
Over 20000
Under 20000
Over 200000
20000 - 200000
Palma
3001 - 10000
10001 - 20000
Under 10000
Over 25000
Under 20000
Over 500000
20000 - 499999
LA RIOJA
CANTABRIA
CASTILLA
LA MANCHA
NAVARRE
BASQUE COUNTRY (d)
ASTURIAS (e)
CANARY ISLANDS (c)
ANDALUSIA
ARAGON
Gran Canaria & Tenerife
Fuerteventura, Lanzarote 
& La Palma
El Hierro & La Gomera
2006
EXTREMADURA
2007
10000 - 25000
2003 2004 2005
CATALONIA
VALENCIA
MADRID
MURCIA 
GALICIA
10001 - 50000
10001 - 25000
25001 - 240000
CASTILE & LEON
CRITERIA FOR DEFINITION AS "LARGE RETAIL OUTLET" (a) (cont'd) TABLE 4
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. Floor space refers to retail floor space (not floor area).
b. Between 2002 and 2007, the definiton of "large retail outlet" was based on the number of employees 
(principal criterion). The floor space figures in the table are the subsidiary criterion.
c. Differentiation between the different islands was only established following enactment of Law 
10/2003 of 3 April 2003.
d. Between 10/11/2000 and 27/03/2001 the limit was set at 400 m2, with certain exceptions according 
to activity and other characteristics.
e. Law 10/2002 of 19 November 2002 also includes, in its definition of large outlets, stores belonging 
to chains with more than25 outlets in the region or with total area in the region of 10000 m2.
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Andalusia 0 0 0 0 0 4 365 366 365 365 365
Aragon 0 0 0 0 209 365 365 366 252 0 0
Balearic Islands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Canary Islands 0 0 0 0 0 0 252 366 365 365 365
Cantabria 0 0 0 0 0 299 365 366 365 365 365
Castile-La Mancha 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Castile and Leon 0 0 0 0 0 0 350 366 365 365 365
Catalonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Valencia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Extremadura 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 44 365
Galicia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Madrid 0 0 226 366 366 365 365 366 365 365 365
Murcia 0 0 296 366 366 365 365 366 365 365 365
Navarre (a) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Basque Country 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Asturias (b) 0 0 0 0 0 40 365 366 365 365 365
La Rioja 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1997 1998 1999REGION 2004 2005 2006 200720032000 2001 2002
DURATION (IN DAYS) OF SPECIFIC TRADING LICENCE (OR EQUIVALENT MEASURE BY REGION) 
FOR HARD DISCOUNT STORES
TABLE 5
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. Regional Law 17/2001 of 12 July 2001 establishes a definition of hard discount stores but does not make them subject 
to granting of a specific regional licence.
b. In this case, Law 10/2002 of 19 November 2002 establishes the need for a prior report which may be considered equivalent 
to a specific trading licence. 
SPECIFICTAX ON LARGE RETAL OULETS (a) TABLE 6      
                                                    
      
REGION REGULATION TAX BASE TAX RATE APPLICABLE 
  
        
                  
      
Aragon 
  Regional Law 
13/2005 of 
30 December 
2005. 
Legislative 
Decree 
1/2007 of  18 
September 
2007
  
Total floor space of 
retail outlets (in m2). 
First 2,000 m2 are 
exempt. 
  On first 1,000 m2 (over 
and above 2,000 m2): 
€12/m2. 
On next 2,000 m2: 
€15/m2. 
On next 5,000 m2: 
€17.40/m2. 
Thereafter: €19/m2. 
  
Since 
1/1/2006 
  
      
  
        
      
Catalonia 
  
Regional Law 
16/2000 of 
29 December 
2000 
Total floor space of 
retail outlets (in m2). 
First 2,499 m2 are 
exempt. The greater 
the surface area, the 
higher the tax. 
€17.429/m2 
  Since 
1/1/2001 (b) 
  
      
    
  
      
Navarre   
Regional Law 
23/2001 of 
27 November 
2001 
Total floor space of 
retail outlets (in m2). 
Exempt: first 2,499 m2 
in Pamplona and 
municipalities with over 
12,000 inhabitants; first 
1,499 m2 elsewhere. 
The greater the surface 
area, the higher the tax. 
€12/m2   
Since 
8/12/2001 
  
      
    
  
      
Asturias 
  Regional Law 
15/2002 of 
27 December 
2002 
Car park area of large 
retail outlets, over and 
above 1,999 m2 
(exemption threshold). 
Tax base adjusted up 
according to outlets' 
catchment area and 
floor space. 
€17/m2 
  
Since 
1/1/2003 
  
      
    
  
                                
                
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. The table only includes those regions that levy specific taxes on large retail outlets. 
b. Measure suspended for 70 days between 24 April and 3 July 2001 by the Constitutional Court.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 34 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0908
Andalusia 01/01/2002-27/06/2003 0 0 0 0 0 365 178 0 0 0 0
Aragon 06/06/2001-10/09/2005
for Zaragoza area
0 0 0 0 209 365 365 366 253 0 0
Balearic Islands
From 22/01/1997 to 22/01/2002
New moratorium as from 
21/05/2005
346 365 365 366 365 22 0 0 225 365 365
Canary Islands "Relative" moratorium since 
16/11/1994
365 365 365 366 365 365 365 366 365 365 365
Cantabria 05/07/2001-06/07/2006 0 0 0 0 180 365 365 366 365 187 0
Castile and 
Leon
13/01/2003-31/12/2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 353 366 365 0 0
Catalonia
Suspension between 27/03/1997
and 27/09/1997. Suspension
between 06/01/2001 and 
02/08/2001 also affecting 
supermarkets (outlets with 400-
2,499 m2). Suspension betwee
13/01/2005 and 13/01/2006. Partial
suspension between 14/01/2006
and 13/07/2006.
185 0 0 0 209 0 0 0 353 194 0
Navarre Moratoria from 12/04/2003 to 
22/04/2004
0 0 0 0 0 0 264 113 0 0 0
Basque Country 01/01/2001-28/03/2001 0 0 0 0 87 0 0 0 0 0 0
Asturias 20/12/2003-20/12/2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 366 354 0 0
1997 1998 1999REGION SUMMARY 2004 2005 2006 200720032000 2001 2002
MORATORIUM OR SUSPENSION PERIODS, BY YEAR AND REGION (a) TABLE 7
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. The table only inludes those regions that establish moratoria. The periods are calculated according to the number of days 
on which the moratoria are in force each year. 
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1 2 3 4 5
ESTIMATION METHOD
unemployment rate (t-1) -0.0062 -0.0061 -0.0077 -0.0065 -0.0089
(-3.66) (-2.91) (-3.15) (-2.34) (-2.85)
rspv (t-1) 0.0242
(5.09)
rspv (t-2) 0.0228
(4.79)
rspv (t-3) 0.0253
(4.77)
rspv (t-4) 0.0272
(4.63)
rspv (t-5) 0.0194
(2.01)
constant -3.8352 -3.8261 -3.8185 -3.8326 -3.7715
(-103.44) (-93.16) (-81.74) (-77.01) (-56.20)
Time variables No No No No No
Observations 160 144 128 112 96
Groups 16 16 16 16 16
R2 (within) 0.2427 0.2215 0.2504 0.2090 0.1570
Breusch-Pagan test (value P) 0 0 0 0 0
Hausman test (value P) 0.9814 0.9298 0.7090 0.6322 0.2805
RANDOM EFFECTS
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. Between brackets, Student's t-statistic.
COMMERCIAL DENSITY ESTIMATES (a) TABLE 8
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 36 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0908
1 2 3 4
ESTIMATION METHOD
FIXED
EFFECTS
unemployment rate (t-1) -0.0108 -0.0104 -0.0106
(-5.01) (-4.63) (-4.60)
rspv (t-1) 0.0168
(3.70)
rspv (t-2) 0.0108
(2.27)
rspv (t-3) 0.0107
(2.07)
rspv (t-4) 0.0197
(2.93)
constant -4.8654 -4.8395 -4.8358 -4.9735
(-65.98) (-68.45) (-70.54) (-177.91)
Time variables No No No No
Observations 80 80 80 80
Groups 16 16 16 16
R2 (within) 0.2818 0.2619 0.2645 0.1297
Breusch-Pagan test (value P) 0 0 0 0
Hausman test (value P) 0.9598 0.9926 0.9948 (b)
RANDOM EFFECTS
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. Between brackets, Student's t-statistic.
b. The equation does not meet the asymptotic hypotheses for the Hausman test.
ESTIMATES OF NUMBER OF TRADITIONAL FOOD STORES / POPULATION (a) TABLE 9
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 37 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0908
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ESTIMATION
METHOD
FIXED
EFFECTS
FIXED
EFFECTS
RANDOM
EFFECTS
FIXED
EFFECTS
RANDOM
EFFECTS
GDP per capita (t-1) 0.5532
(5.85)
unemployment rate (t-1) -0.0402 -0.0339 -0.0384
(-5.34) (-3.66) (-4.61)
rspv (t-1) 0.0705 0.0443
(2.05) (2.19)
rspv (t-2) 0.0493 0.0748 0.0488
(3.05) (2.39) (3.06)
rspv (t-3) 0.0505
(1.97)
rspv (t-5) 0.0630
(3.95)
constant -7.3188 -7.5660 -13.0467 -7.3883 -7.5025 -7.2276 -7.6425
(-38.10) (-61.65) (-14.49) (-36.52) (-62.01) (-43.91) (-68.57)
Time variables No Yes No No Yes No No
Observations 80 80 80 80 80 80 80
Groups 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
R2 (within) 0.4827 0.6916 0.7081 0.6008 0.7348 0.4674 0.1604
Breusch-Pagan test 
(value P)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hausman test (value P) (b) 0.9715 (b) (b) 0.8214 (b) 0.3105
Wald test, time var. 
(value P)
- 0 - - 0 - -
RANDOM EFFECTS
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. Between brackets, Student's t-statistic.
b. The equation does not meet the asymptotic hypotheses for the Hausman test.
ESTIMATES OF NUMBER OF SUPERMARKETS / POPULATION (a) TABLE 10
1
ESTIMATION METHOD
FIXED
EFFECTS
GDP per capita (t-1) 2.1871
(5.56)
Average wage (t-1) -0.6601
(-1.99)
rspv (t-5) -0.0725
(-2.27)
constant -31.0725
(-9.54)
Time variables No
Observations 96
Groups 16
R2 (within) 0.6863
Breusch-Pagan test (value P) 0
Hausman test (value P) 0.0093
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. Between brackets, Student's t-statistic.
ESTIMATES OF NUMBER OF HYPERMARKETS / 
POPULATION (a)
TABLE 11
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ESTIMATION
METHOD
RANDOM
EFFECTS
GDP per capita 0.3467 0.1527 0.3282 0.3520
(12.31) (13.06) (14.49) (17.18)
unemployment rate -0.0032 -0.0071 -0.0022
(-3.75) (-8.29) (-2.13)
0.0162 0.0128
(2.22) (2.85)
rspv (t-1) 0.0077 0.0061
(2.23) (2.30)
rspv (t-2) 0.0064 0.0143
(2.2) (8.34)
rspv (t-3) 0.0226 0.0259 0.0009
(2.79) (3.77) (2.47)
constant -3.3439 0.0363 -1.4634 0.0423 -3.1988 -3.4617 0.0182
(-12.53) (2.02) (-13.45) (3.28) (-13.87) (-16.66) (9.01)
Time variables No No No No No No Yes
Observations 32 64 48 48 32 32 80
Groups 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
R2 (within) 0.9428 0.2891 0.9583 0.4242 0.9547 0.9617 0.6129
Breusch-Pagan test 
(value P)
0.0022 0.0474 0.0454 0.0237 0.0018 0.0022 0
Hausman test (value P) 0.0000 0.0035 0 0.0002 0 (b) 0.9981
Wald test, time var. 
(value P)
- - - - - - 0
average wage (t) - 
average wage (t-1)
FIXED EFFECTS
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. Between brackets, Student's t-statistic.
b. The equation does not meet the asymptotic hypotheses for the Hausman test.
INFLATION RATE ESTIMATES (a) TABLE 12
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1 2 3 4 5 6
ESTIMATION METHOD
FIXED
EFFECTS
RANDOM
EFFECTS
FIXED
EFFECTS
RANDOM
EFFECTS
FIXED
EFFECTS
RANDOM
EFFECTS
GDP per capita 0.8015 1.3564 1.3421
(8.93) (4.57) (4.56)
Average wage -0.2006 -0.8452 -0.7221 -0.8871 -0.7506 -0.9305
(-2.81) (-3.6) (-2.68) (-3.36) (-2.73) (-3.44)
rspv -0.0342 -0.0287
(-2.39) (-2.43)
rspv (t-1) -0.0443 -0.0316
(-2.85) (-3.14)
rspv (t-2) -0.0369 -0.0292
(-3.04) (-2.74)
constant 3.7947 12.6776 -0.5009 12.7127 -0.3391 12.7846
(5.25) (24.88) (-0.22) (24.96) (-0.15) (24.53)
Time variables No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 144 144 128 128 128 128
Groups 16 16 16 16 16 16
R2 (within) 0.6461 0.7419 0.5720 0.6642 0.5543 0.6579
Breusch-Pagan test 
(value P)
0 0 0 0 0 0
Hausman test 
(value P)
(b) 0.9615 (b) 0.9797 (b) 0.7358
Wald test, time var. 
(value P)
- 0 - 0 - 0
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. Between brackets, Student's t-statistic.
b. The equation does not meet the asymptotic hypotheses for the Hausman test.
ESTIMATES OF NUMBERS EMPLOYED IN RETAILING (a) TABLE 13
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 40 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0908
INDICATOR OF RETAIL TRADE RESTRICTION BY REGION (a) CHART 1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a.  Excluding the Basque Country.
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
Andalusia La Rioja
Madrid Asturias
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
Aragon Castile-La Mancha
Cantabria Balearic Islands
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
Castile and Leon Galicia
Canary Islands Murcia
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
Extremadura Navarre
Catalonia Valencia
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. Not including the Basque Country.
LEVEL OF REGULATION OF RETAIL TRADE BY REGION CHART 2     
Below 4
From 4 to 4.99
From 5 to 5.99
6 and over
4.1
3.5 3.3
3.9
4.0
4.1 4.1
4.04.6
3.5
3.5
3.33.3
3.8
4.5
3.2
1997
3.3
6.2 4.5
5.0
3.7
5.5 5.4
5.24.2
5.0
5.1
4.05.5
4.9
5.3
4.0
2007
(a)(a)
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REGION
Andalusia 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 2497 1924 1924 1924 1924 1924
Aragon 1341 1341 1341 1341 1341 1341 1341 1341 1341 1341 1341
Balearic Islands 2500 2500 2162 511 752 987 987 987 987 987 987
Canary Islands 1036 1036 1036 1036 1036 1036 1309 1431 1431 1431 1431
Cantabria 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500
Castile-La Mancha 2500 2050 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 1608 1231 1231 1231
Castile and Leon 1729 1729 1729 1729 1729 1729 1494 1485 1485 1485 1485
Catalonia 2054 2024 2024 2024 1780 1775 1775 1775 1775 1775 1775
Valencia 787 787 787 787 787 787 787 787 787 787 787
Extremadura 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 1802 1207 1207 1207 1207 1207
Galicia 1199 1199 1199 1199 1199 1199 1199 2500 2500 2500 2500
Madrid 2500 2500 2456 2428 2428 2428 2428 2428 2428 2428 2428
Murcia 2500 2500 2046 1932 1932 1932 1932 1932 1932 1932 1932
Navarre 1977 1977 1977 1977 1977 1977 1977 1977 1977 1977 1977
2000 2000 2000 2000 1548 1544 1544 1544 1544 1544 1544
Asturias 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500
La Rioja 1783 1783 1783 1783 1783 1783 1783 1783 1783 1783 1783
Basque Country
2006 20071997 1998 1999 2004 200520032000 2001 2002
MINIMUM FLOOR SPACE REQUIRED TO BE DEEMED LARGE RETAIL OUTLET ACCORDING TO POPULATION 
WEIGHTED BY MUNICIPALITY CRITERION
TABLE A.1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
Andalusia 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 5.0 5.0 5.0
Aragon 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 5.0 5.0 5.0
Balearic Islands 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
Canary Islands 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 5.0 5.0 5.0
Cantabria 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 5.0 5.0 5.0
Castile-La Mancha 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 5.0 5.0
Castile and Leon 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8
Catalonia 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 5.0 5.0 5.0
Valencia 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8
Extremadura 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 5.0 5.0 5.0
Galicia 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 5.0 5.0 5.0
Madrid 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8
Murcia 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 5.0 5.0 5.0
Navarre 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8
Basque Country 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
Asturias 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 5.0 5.0 5.0
La Rioja 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8
2001 2002REGION 2005 2006 200720031997 1998 1999 20042000
(Base 10)
TABLE A.2
SOURCE: Banco de España.
OVERALL WEEKLY OPENING HOURS INDICATOR 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 42 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0908
Andalusia 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.6 8.5 8.3 8.2 8.8 8.8 8.8
Aragon 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.6 8.5 8.3 8.2 8.8 8.8 8.8
Balearic Islands 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.6 8.5 9.2 8.2 8.8 8.8 8.8
Canary Islands 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.6 8.5 8.3 8.2 8.6 8.6 8.6
Cantabria 8.8 8.6 8.5 8.5 8.6 8.5 8.3 8.2 8.8 8.8 8.8
Castile-La Mancha 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.6 8.5 8.3 8.2 8.8 8.8 8.8
Castile and Leon 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.6 8.5 8.3 8.2 8.8 8.8 8.8
Catalonia 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.6 8.6 8.5 8.3 8.2 8.8 8.8 8.8
Valencia 8.8 8.9 8.8 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.3 8.3 8.5 8.8 8.8
Extremadura 8.6 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.6 8.5 8.3 8.2 8.8 8.8 8.8
Galicia 8.5 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.6 8.5 8.3 7.6 8.8 8.8 8.8
Madrid 8.0 8.0 8.0 7.9 7.3 7.1 6.8 6.8 7.0 7.0 7.0
Murcia 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.6 8.5 8.3 8.2 8.2 8.5 8.5
Navarre 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.6 8.5 8.3 8.2 8.2 8.8 8.8
Basque Country 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
Asturias 8.9 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.6 8.5 8.3 8.2 8.8 8.8 8.8
La Rioja 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.6 8.5 8.3 8.2 8.8 8.8 8.8
2005 2006 20072003REGION 1997 1998 1999 20042000 2001 2002
SUNDAY AND PUBLIC HOLIDAY OPENINGS INDICATOR
(Base 10)
TABLE A.3
SOURCE: Banco de España.
Andalusia 7.1 7.1 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.1 7.1 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2
Aragon 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.9 6.9 7.1 7.1 6.5
Balearic Islands 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1
Canary Islands 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2
Cantabria 5.7 5.7 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.7 6.4 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7
Castile-La Mancha 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5
Castile and Leon 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.8 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.8
Catalonia 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.1 7.2 7.1 7.2 7.2 7.2
Valencia 7.1 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.9 6.7 6.9 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.9
Extremadura 5.7 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.2 7.1 7.1 7.2 7.3
Galicia 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7
Madrid 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7
Murcia 7.1 7.1 7.2 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.2 7.2 7.1
Navarre 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.1 7.1 7.2 7.1 7.2 7.2 7.2
Basque Country 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.8 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.8 5.9 5.9 5.9
Asturias 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.2 7.2
La Rioja 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.1 7.2 7.1 7.2 7.2 7.2
2001 2002REGION 2004 2005 2006 20071997 1998 1999 20032000
SEASONAL SALES INDICATOR
(Base 10)
TABLE A.4
SOURCE: Banco de España.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 43 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0908
REGION
Andalusia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
Aragon 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6
Balearic Islands 0.0 0.0 1.4 8.0 7.0 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1
Canary Islands 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 4.8 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3
Cantabria 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Castile-La Mancha 0.0 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.6 5.1 5.1 5.1
Castile and Leon 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1
Catalonia 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9
Valencia 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9
Extremadura 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.8 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2
Galicia 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Madrid 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Murcia 0.0 0.0 1.8 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
Navarre 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1
Basque Country 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8
Asturias 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
La Rioja 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9
2006 20071997 1998 1999 20032000 2001 2002 2004 2005
DEFINITION OF LARGE RETAIL OUTLET INDICATOR
(Base 10)
TABLE A.5
SOURCE: Banco de España.
Andalusia 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 10 10 10 10 10
Aragon 0 0 0 0 5.7 10 10 10 6.9 0 0
Balearic Islands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Canary Islands 0 0 0 0 0 0 6.9 10 10 10 10
Cantabria 0 0 0 0 0 8.2 10 10 10 10 10
Castile-La Mancha 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Castile and Leon 0 0 0 0 0 0 9.6 10 10 10 10
Catalonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Valencia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Extremadura 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.2 10
Galicia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Madrid 0 0 6.2 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Murcia 0 0 8.1 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Navarre 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Basque Country 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Asturias 0 0 0 0 0 1.1 10 10 10 10 10
La Rioja 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2001 2002REGION 2004 2005 2006 20071997 1998 1999 20032000
SPECIFIC LICENCE FOR HARD DISCOUNT STORES INDICATOR
(Base 10)
TABLE A.6
SOURCE: Banco de España.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 44 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0908
Andalusia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Aragon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 10
Balearic Islands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Canary Islands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cantabria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Castile-La Mancha 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Castile and Leon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Catalonia 0 0 0 0 8.1 10 10 10 10 10 10
Valencia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Extremadura 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Galicia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Madrid 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Murcia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Navarre 0 0 0 0 0.7 10 10 10 10 10 10
Basque Country 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Asturias 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 10 10 10
La Rioja 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1997 1998 1999REGION 2004 2005 2006 200720032000 2001 2002
SPECIFIC TAX ON LARGE RETAIL OUTLETS INDICATOR
(Base 10)
TABLE A.7
SOURCE: Banco de España.
Andalusia 0 0 0 0 0 10 4.9 0 0 0 0
Aragon 0 0 0 0 2.9 5.1 5.1 5.1 3.5 0 0
Balearic Islands 9.5 10 10 10 10 0.6 0 0 6.2 10 10
Canary Islands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cantabria 0 0 0 0 4.9 10 10 10 10 5.1 0
Castile-La Mancha 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Castile and Leon 0 0 0 0 0 0 9.7 10 10 0 0
Catalonia 5.1 0 0 0 5.7 0 0 0 9.7 0.4 0
Valencia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Extremadura 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Galicia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Madrid 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Murcia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Navarre 0 0 0 0 0 0 7.2 3.1 0 0 0
Basque Country 0 0 0 0 2.4 0 0 0 0 0 0
Asturias 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3 10 9.7 0 0
La Rioja 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2001 2002REGION 2004 2005 2006 20071997 1998 1999 20032000
(Base 10)
TABLE A.8
SOURCE: Banco de España.
MORATORIA INDICATOR
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 45 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0908
Overall weekly opening hours -0.101 0.006 0.070 0.004 0.850 0.603
Seasonal sales 0.213 0.028 0.692 0.366 0.423 0.149
Sunday & public holiday openings 0.703 0.305 0.077 0.004 -0.429 0.154
Specific taxes -0.073 0.003 0.786 0.472 -0.072 0.004
Hard discount licence -0.778 0.373 0.030 0.001 -0.032 0.001
Moratoria -0.364 0.082 0.449 0.154 -0.307 0.079
Definition of large retail outlet 0.572 0.202 0.017 0.000 0.108 0.010
Weight of factor in synthetic indicator 0.393 0.318 0.290
1.62 1.31 1.20
23.1 18.7 17.1
Bartlett's test of sphericity (21 degrees of freedom)
Kaiser, Meyer and Olkin's measure of sample suitability
Sunday & public holiday openings
VARIABLE
WEIGHT OF VARIABLE IN SYNTHETIC 
INDICATOR
Variance explained by each factor
VARIABLE
0.179
Loading
factor
Weight of variable
in factor
FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3
Loading
factor
Weight of variable 
in factor
Loading
factor
Weight of variable 
in factor
58.9
102.6
0.47
0.170
Selection criteria
Eigen values
Variance explained by factors
Seasonal sales
Overall weekly opening hours
0.147
0.104
Hard discount licence
Specific taxes
Moratoria
Definition of large retail outlet 0.082
0.166
0.152
RESULTS OF FACTOR ANALYSIS (a) TABLE A.9   
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. Factor analysis using the principal components method and rotating the factors using the varimax method. Includes 
the BasqueCountry. 
Overall weekly opening hours 1
Sunday & public holiday openings 0.4919 1
Seasonal sales 0.0722 0.2823 1
Specific taxes -0.1180 0.0095 0.2715 1
Definition of large retail outlet -0.0444 0.2252 0.1459 -0.1055 1
Hard discount licence -0.1905 -0.4064 -0.0734 -0.0193 -0.1959 1
Moratoria -0.0653 0.0280 0.0167 0.0997 -0.0321 0.2051 1
Hard discount
licence
MoratoriaOverall weekly
opening hours
Sunday & 
public holiday 
openings
Seasonal sales Specific taxes Definition of large
retail outlet
CORRELATION BETWEEN VARIABLES (a) TABLE A.10
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. Excluding the Basque Country.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 46 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0908
0.876 0.464 -0.134 0.013 0.133 0.013
0.806 0.393 0.228 0.039 -0.265 0.053
0.183 0.020 0.735 0.402 -0.224 0.038
-0.117 0.008 0.767 0.438 0.119 0.011
-0.041 0.001 0.105 0.008 -0.768 0.445
-0.432 0.113 -0.003 0.000 0.583 0.257
0.013 0.000 0.365 0.099 0.493 0.184
Weight of factor in synthetic indicator 0.382 0.311 0.307
1.65 1.34 1.33
23.6 19.2 18.9
Hard discount licence
Moratoria
Variance explained by each factor
Sunday & public holiday openings
Seasonal sales
Specific taxes
Definition of large retail outlet
0.087
0.144
0.143
Seasonal sales
Selection criteria
Eigen values
Specific taxes
Definition of large retail outlet
Hard discount licence
Moratoria
WEIGHT OF VARIABLE IN SYNTHETIC 
INDICATOR
Overall weekly opening hours
0.140
Loading
factor
Weight of variable 
in factor
Variance explained by factors
Bartlett's test of sphericity (21 degrees of freedom)
VARIABLE
Overall weekly opening hours
Sunday & public holiday openings
148.2
VARIABLE
0.186
0.51
0.122
0.179
Kaiser, Meyer and Olkin's measure of sample suitability
FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3
61.7
Loading
factor
Weight of variable 
 in factor
Loading
factor
Weight of variable
in factor
RESULTS OF FACTOR ANALYSIS (a) TABLE A.11
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. Factor analysis using the principal components method and rotating the factors using the varimax method. Excludes 
the Basque Country.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 47 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0908
INDICATOR OF RETAIL TRADE RESTRICTION BY REGION (a) CHART A1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. Including the Basque Country.
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